Abstract -Modern business activities rely on extensive email exchange. Various solutions attempt to analyze email exchange in order to prevent emails from being sent to the wrong recipients.
INTRODUCTION

Most
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review state-of-the-art solutions. Section 3 presents the overview of the proposed solution. In section 4 we describe in details the proposed classification model. In section 5 we explain the performed evaluation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
We reviewed techniques for detecting wrong email recipients. Our review includes advanced commercial products and the latest published academic research.
Commercial products, such as Symantec [2], Web sense [5] , McAfee [6] , RSA, and Vericept [7] , are aimed at preventing sensitive data from leaking via electronic communication channels. Their solutions are embedded on the network level, where an email is inspected and a policy can be applied. A policy may define groups of users that are allowed to be exposed to certain contents and therefore it is possible to identify recipients that should not receive the email. All commercial products address mainly emails that are sent out of the organization.
Google provides its users with an application that aims to prevent an email from reaching the "Wrong Bob". To the best of our knowledge Google's "Wrong Bob" is based on analyzing the groups of people a user usually exchanges emails with, and alerting the user if an unexpected person has been added to the email as a recipient. The disadvantage of Google's application is that it only works on group emails. "Got the Wrong Bob" won't know if a user has got the wrong Bob when he or she is sending an email to a single recipient [2] [8]- [9] .
Kalyan and Chandrasekaran [10] propose email pattern analysis to detect data leaks via email. The likelihood that an email has been sent by mistake is determined by analyzing attributes of emails previously exchanged between the sender and the recipients of the email. The attributes include time, attachment size, salutation and ending, existence of BCC recipients, etc. The proposed technique has been used on real life emails, with detection accuracy close to 92%.
Carvalho and Cohen [3] attempt to predict whether a sent email is a leak or not based on the textual content of the email, and how likely the recipient is to receive a particular message.
Messages sent to past recipients are modeled into <message, recipient> pairs, and such a pair is considered to be a potential leak if the message is sufficiently different from past messages sent to that recipient. The second technique is a classification-based method and has been implemented by using social network information (such as the number of received and sent messages, the number of times two recipients were addressed in the same message, etc.). The idea is to perform the leak prediction in two steps. [n the first step, textual similarity scores are calculated using a cross-validation procedure in the training set. [n the second step, network features are extracted and a function that combines these features with the textual scores is calculated.
In order to test their method, Carvalho and Cohen simulated email leaks using the Enron email dataset [4] . The dataset was used to imitate realistic types of leaks, such as misspellings of email addresses, typos, similar first/last names, etc. The method was able to detect email leaks in almost 82% of the test cases. The advantage of this approach is that it can be easily implemented for an email client and it does not use information that is only available to the server (which enables a client-side implementation).
[n a later study by Carvalho et al. [12] , the authors presented a case study of the solution in [3] on the Mozilla Thunderbird. They also expanded the proposed solution not only to detect undesired recipients, but also to suggest recipients that the user has forgotten to add. The new method uses various machine learning and data mining techniques.
These techniques study past email exchanges and suggest, according to the learned model, adding or removing a recipient.
[t has been proposed installing the solution as a plug-in to the Mozilla Thunderbird engine. Participants in the study conducted by Carvalho et al. were required to write email using Thunderbird on a daily basis. The evaluation showed diverse results: more than 15% of the users reported that the email client prevented real cases of email leaks; more than 47% of the users accepted recommendations provided by the data mining techniques; and more than 80% of the users reported that they would pennanently use this solution if a few improvements were added.
Stolfo et al. [13] demonstrate how the Email Mining Toolkit (EMT) [14] can detect the beginning of a viral propagation in emails without content-based or signature-based analysis. EMT is a data mining system that is applied online to email files gathered from email clients or server logs. It retrieves models of user email accounts and of groups of accounts. EMT also implements clique fmding algorithms and applies them on the account of a single user to find the user's recipient cliques and on group of user accounts to fmd social groups. EMT aggregates statistical infonnation from groups of accounts and provides the means for detecting malicious emails (emails that contain spam or viruses) and malicious users.
The work of Stolfo et al. [13] and the EMT toolkit [14] do not focus on detecting wrong email recipients, nevertheless, we chose to review these two works, since they present powerful techniques which could possibly be applied to detect wrong email recipients. [n commercial products it is possible to define groups of users that are allowed to receive emails with a specific content.
These users are not necessarily communicating with each other. Thus, in cases as described above, sending an email from Bob to Alice won't be classified as a potential leak. However, identifying the groups in issue is a manual task, which begets a tremendous effort when considering a large organization with thousands of users.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The proposed classification scheme is based on email exchange traffic among members of the organization (further on members of the organization will be referred to as users).
The proposed scheme consists of two phases. In the first phase, groups of users that exchange emails with similar content, i.e., common topic, are identified. It is assumed that a user may belong to several groups working on distinct topics (typical for a manager). This phase will be further referred to as Group Communication Analysis. 
IV. EMAIL LEAKAGE DETECTION
The email leakage detection consists of two phases: a training phase (i.e., generating the classification model) and a classification phase. The training is applied on a set of emails known to be "leak free" and the classification is applied on a newly composed emails represented as queries. Let a query refer to an email with content c that is about to be sent from a sender s to a recipient r, and it is modeled as the triplet (s, r, c).
Therefore, an email with x recipients defmes x queries ((S,T1,C), .. , (S,Tx, c)). Note that content c may include any document attached to the email.
The content of every email in the dataset is represented by a TF-IDF vector [11] . These vectors are computed as follows:
\) Extract terms from the emails in the training dataset after removing stop words and applying a stemming algorithm.
2) For every term, compute the Inverse Document 2) Each email i is assigned to its nearest cluster, i.e., a cluster j with the highest Cosine similarity to the email.
Thus, each email in the training set is associated with only one cluster.
3) For each cluster, we create a representation of its unique tenns and the context in which they appear. This is done by implementing the method described in [16] . where e _t (emails threshold) is a threshold that defines the minimal number of emails associated with cluster 9 sent or received by a user.
5)
In order to improve the model's accuracy, two social network features that were proposed in [3] are considered: a) for each two users Ul and U2, calculate the number of emails user Uj has sent to user U2 divided by the sum of recipients in all emails Ul has sent (the "frequency feature"); b) in how many emails users Uj and U2 were both addressed (the "co-occurrence feature").
The classification phase of an email with content c sent from s to r represented by a query (s, r, c) is performed as follows (see flow chart in Figure 3 ): 1) Retrieve all the clusters of which both the sender and the recipient are "members". Compare content c to each of the clusters using the method described in [16] and derive a "score" for each cluster.
2) If the "score" for each of the common clusters is 0, extract all the clusters of which the recipient is a member. Select among these clusters, those clusters whose centroid has some minimal similarity to the email (detennined by Cosine measure). Next, use the method described in [16] in order to calculate a score for each of these clusters.
3) If the score for every examined cluster is 0, we use the frequency and co-occurrence measures described in [3] in order to try and determine if the recipient is "legitimate". Since the scores generated by the model proposed in [16] usually vary between 0 and 1500, we multiplied the sum of these two measures (which can vary between 0 and 2) by 250. This parameter was set empirically.
4)
If the maximal score equals to or is higher than a predefined threshold, then r is a legitimate recipient, otherwise, r is a potential leak. The second step consisted of transforming the emails into TF-IDF vectors and training the classification model. In our implementation we used k=100 when applying the K-Means algorithm. Finally, the third step consisted of parsing the emails in the testing set and classifying them. We used e_t=lfor retrieving clusters common both for the sender and recipient.
B. Simulating wrong recipients
To the best of our knowledge there is no validated infonnation regarding which of the emails' recipient in the Enron corpus is an accidental or an intentional leakage. Therefore, we prefer to assume that the original recipients of emails are legitimate, although this may cause a slight worsening in the evaluation results.
For each email in the testing set sent by user u, one random, simulated, recipient, which was not among the original recipients of the email, was "injected". There were two conditions for the inclusion of the false recipient: a) it had to appear in the training set, b) it had not received (in the training set) an email with the same subject as the email it is now being assigned to. 
